The 1946 Treaty of Manila

Like the Commonwealth Act of 1934 or Philippine Independence Act of 1934, the Filipino people were never asked if we wanted to secede from the U.S. in 1946. And yet in the Pledge of Allegiance, Americans swear:

” . . . one nation under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all.”

On Nov. 6, 2012, a referendum was held in Puerto Rico, and only a tiny 5.6 percent of Puerto Ricans voted for independence.

On Sept. 18, 2014 a referendum was held in Scotland to determine if Scotland should be independent. The Scottish people voted no to independence

All these referenda should remind Americans and Filipinos that there was no referendum held when known Japanese collaborator Manuel A. Roxas sought independence for the oil, gas and mineral rich, Philippines, then a U.S. Territory. The US Senate prematurely, irresponsibly and unconstitutionally granted the Philippines dependent-independence when the Treaty of Manila was ratified of Manila on 22 October 1946.

The Volstead Act was repealed. The Takata air bags were recalled but the 1946 Treaty of Manila has not been rescinded.

On Dec. 21, 2015 when Steve Harvey realized his mistake in announcing Miss Colombia as the winner instead of Miss Philippines, he immediately corrected his mistake. Comedians are better than American politicians.

The U.S. Senate to this day continues to fund, aid and abet oppression, treason and corruption in the former U.S. territory using American taxpayers’ money through the World Bank.

Anyone on this planet who still believes countries like the former U.S. territory, the Philippines, is ready for independence and self-rule:

a.) Should have his or her head examined, starting with the U.S. Senate.

b.) Should live in the Philippines and experience first-hand the hell on earth.

c.) Must have ulterior motives.

Here is the Treaty of Manila that granted dependent-independence to the Philippines, a U.S. territory and created the hell on earth. We were handed over to oligarch-traitors who wanted to escape justice for collaborating with the Japanese during WWII.

“The Treaty of Manila of 1946 (61 Stat. 1174, TIAS 1568, 7 UNTS 3), formally the Treaty of general relations and Protocol,[1] is a treaty of general relations signed on 4 July 1946 in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines.

The United States GRANTED the PHILIPPINES INDEPENDENCE, and the treaty provided for the recognition of that independence. The treaty was signed by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt as a representative of the United States and President Manuel Roxas representing the Philippines.

The treaty became effective in the United States on 22 October 1946, when it was ratified by the Senate (79th Congress).”

The 1946 Treaty of Manila
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Manila_(1946)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UX660r0CNE

PRES. CORAZON C. AQUINO TOLD U.S. TROOPS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY – Congressional Quarterly 1991

PRES. CORAZON C. AQUINO TOLD U.S. TROOPS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY

U.S. Military Told To Leave Philippines

An article from CQ Almanac 1991

http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal91-1111026

Document Outline

Volcano Mired Deal

Strategic Considerations

A series of international and domestic events — ranging from a natural disaster to the breakup of the Soviet Union — turned 1991 into a turning point for relations between the United States and the Philippines. The culmination came Dec. 27, when the government of President Corazon C. Aquino told U.S. troops to leave the country.

Document Citation
“U.S. Military Told To Leave Philippines.” In CQ Almanac 1991, 47th ed., 433-34. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992.

The decision signaled the end of the vast U.S. military presence in the area, a presence that dated back to 1898 when control of the islands was wrested from the Spahish. The Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946, although the bases continued to play a principal role for U.S. armed forces in the Pacific theater for decades afterward.

In negotiations with the United States throughout 1991, Philippine officials insisted on $825 million in annual U.S. compensation — half in cash and half in trade and other concessions — in return for a seven-year agreement to continue operation of the military bases. U.S. negotiators said they wanted a 10-year pact tied to $360 million in annual aid.

The talks were disrupted by a volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in early June that nearly destroyed Clark Air Base and damaged the Subic Bay Naval Station. But negotiators finally settled on treaty language that would have provided a 10-year lease for the Subic Bay naval base and $203 million in annual aid for the duration. The operating lease for the naval base expired in September 1991.

But lawmakers in both countries were unhappy with the agreement.

A powerful contingent of Philippine nationalists argued against the base treaty, saying that the presence of the U.S. military amounted to a colonial dominance and an intrusion on Philippine sovereignty. On Sept. 16, the 23-member Philippine Senate voted to reject the base treaty.

U.S. lawmakers, meanwhile, were frustrated by the persistent requests from the Philippines for infusions of aid, especially as a prerequisite for continued U.S. military presence there.

Members of Congress were questioning the strategic importance of the military bases, given the diminished Cold War atmosphere that was accompanying the breakup of the Soviet Union.

There was also reluctance to pay the Philippines billions of dollars to keep open bases overseas when declining defense budgets were forcing the closing of domestic bases in congressional districts across the country. (Base closings, p. 427)

“This has the Filipinos competing in the U.S. Congress with the Alabama National Guard,” said Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa. “Everyone in Congress is sympathetic to

the Philippines. On the other hand when the tough choices have to be made, the handwriting is on the wall.”

Other lawmakers, such as House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., said the Philippine rejection of the treaty could free money that could be redirected as foreign aid in places such as the former Soviet republics.

“Countries are lined up for the money that might be available,” said Sen. Richard G. Lugar, R-Ind., a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Volcano Mired Deal

The volcanic eruption in early June of the Philippines’ Mount Pinatubo, located 10 miles west of Clark Air Base and approximately 25 miles north of the Subic Bay naval base, dumped billions of tons of ash throughout the surrounding areas. The disaster forced the evacuation and subsequent closing of the Clark base and the curtailment of operations at Subic Bay.

Following the eruption, about 18,000 U.S. citizens were evacuated from the bases, which also employed more than 70,000 Filipinos. Many more islanders were uprooted from their homes as the volcano smothered large swaths of land with deep heavy ash.

Members of Congress who had been skeptical about the need to retain the bases and frustrated by Philippine resistance to the treaty were even more doubtful that the cost of repairing the bases would be worthwhile. U.S. officials in the Philippines were reported to have estimated that Clark’s repair bill would have approached $300 million and possibly more.

The future of the bases had been further clouded by geological reports that indicated that the volcano might remain intermittently active for as long as 25 years, potentially disrupting any costly repair of the two remaining U.S. bases. Four other bases had been returned to Philippine control during the year.

“What’s the point of spending a fortune to put it all back together, if it’s all going to come apart again?” asked Rep. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., the chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, and an outspoken critic of U.S. military spending abroad.

Strategic Considerations

While the volcano sealed the fate of the Clark base, U.S. lawmakers and the Bush administration were careful to clarify that they wanted to maintain a strategic relationship with the Philippines, and especially to continue to lease the base at Subic Bay. Abandonment of the bases was not the expressed desire of the administration, either before or immediately following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo.

“All things being equal, we would very much like to stay at both Clark and Subic,” Pete Williams, the spokesman for the Pentagon, had said on June 25.

But others held different views. A number of experts, including a handful in the Pentagon, had professed the view even prior to the volcano that operations performed at Clark and Subic Bay could be undertaken elsewhere, such as in Guam, Okinawa, Singapore and Hawaii, and that such a move would make sense, given the undercurrent of resentment of the U.S. presence in the Philippines.

Most agreed, however, that the massive, 60,000-acre Subic Bay facility held a unique and highly valued position with the U.S. Navy, providing it a deepwater port in a strategic location that could accommodate almost every maintenance, repair and supply need of the Pacific fleet.

According to a published report, U.S. officials tried to salvage the Subic Bay lease late in the year by proposing a three-year phased withdrawal from the Philippines, in the hope that the lease agreement might be revived and extended following election of a new Philippine government the following year. But that attempt also foundered, apparently over U.S. reluctance to agree to a firm schedule for removal of troops and equipment under Philippine direction.

Philippine President Aquino, who had strongly supported renewal of the lease agreement, also floated a proposal that a national referendum be held to save the bases. But in the face of widespread political opposition she backed away from

that proposal and later expressed more interest in the U.S. plan for a phased withdrawal.

When all efforts failed, Aquino ordered U.S. troops out of the naval port by the end of 1992.

Defense Department officials had told Congress earlier that if the base were closed, the United States would not seek a new naval base in Asia.

“New bases are neither fiscally feasible nor in keeping with the security relationships we have with our friends in the region,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford Jr. told the House Foreign Affairs Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on Sept. 25. “Functions and missions would be dispersed among existing facilities in the region and in the U.S.”

Document Citation
“U.S. Military Told To Leave Philippines.” In CQ Almanac 1991, 47th ed., 433-34. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal91-1111026 .

Document ID: cqal91-1111026
Document URL: http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal91-1111026

Declassified CIA Report: Summary: Possible Impact of the Granting Amnesty to Filipino collaborators 28 Mar. 1948

NOVEMBER – NATIVE AMERICAN HERITAGE MONTH

“Three things you cannot hide for long: the sun, the moon and the TRUTH.” – Buddha

SUMMARY

President Roxas’ proclamation of 28 January, granting amnesty to Filipinos accused of political and economic collaboration with the Japanese has, in effect, reversed a logical course of postwar justice: those who actively aided the Japanese occupation are now not only free but may well be in a position to regain control of the government; many of those who opposed the Japanese and aided the US in recovery of the Philippines are in effect subject to persecution despite – or even as a result of – these endeavors.

Several hundred Filipino guerrillas, who opposed the occupation under their own or US leadership, are now in custody and subject to prosecution in the Philippine courts for alleged acts of violence committed during the war as part of their anti-Japanese and anti-collaborationist activities.

With the declaration of amnesty and thus the strengthening of power of the very elements against which most of these acts were perpetrated, it is obvious that Filipino testimony in behalf of accused guerillas will be difficult to obtain.

Testimony of US personnel who participated in Philippine guerilla activities would require both the consent of US citizens to appear in the Philippines AND the Philippine Government (pro-Japanese) acquiescence in their appearance.

The ultimate effect of the amnesty, therefore, may well be detrimental to US interests in the Philippines in that:

Elements suffering from its effects will believe themselves betrayed by the US and thus may reverse their previous loyalty to it; and
FORMER COLLABORATIONISTS who play on extreme Philippine nationalism and are themselves secretly or avowedly ANTI-US are likely to achieve political and economic control.

Note: The information in this report is as of 30 March 1948.

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, Navy and Air Force have concurred in this report.